Nick Huggett's Philosophy of Science Bibliography

€ This bibliography is intended for advanced undergraduates or for a graduate survey course. For the former the list is pretty maximal, and so that students are not overloaded I suggest they use it for ideas for further reading, skimming as much as possible, but only reading a few articles of interest on each topic. For graduate students I think a comprehensive survey should have them read most of the things on the list, though some more thoroughly than others.

€ Many of the readings are to be found in Boyd, Gasper and Trout's collection, The Philosophy of Science, as I wanted to maximize the number of pieces that the students could have collected in one place. As you'll see, I also draw heavily on Papineau's recent collection, The Philosophy of Science, on Salmon &al's;Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, and Hacking's Representing and Intervening. These last two I have found extremely useful for their introductory survey essays. (Full citations below)

€ The bibliography is designed so that most of the major figures and ideas in twentieth century philosophy of science are covered (as far as possible through original texts, but sometimes through secondary sources). Some will no doubt think that it is better pedagogy to cover fewer topics in more detail, to spend less time studying the views of others, and more time letting students practice philosophy. Despite the range of topics covered I have found that in a standard semester it is possible to cover the bulk of the material here, and give the students time to develop their own more specific projects: typically students develop substantial final papers in a series of drafts in the second half of the term.

€ The other problem with attempting a broad survey is that some issues don't get the time they perhaps deserve: in particular, I feel that I could do a better job of integrating sociological and feminist approaches into the bibliography.

€ Finally, I apologize that the references aren't in full Chicago Manual of Style form: the reading list was written for students finding books on library reserve, so I kept the citations brief.

€ I hope that you find this syllabus useful: please let me have any comments that you might have (especially through the HOPOS-L list.) Any additions, subtractions or corrections are welcome.

Philosophy of Science Annotated Bibliography
Nick Huggett, University of Illinois at Chicago - 3/25/97

€ 'BGT' indicates that a reference is to be found in Boyd, Gasper and Trout (eds) The Philosophy of Science: MIT Press, 1993.
€ Parentheses around suggestions indicate that these are less recommended on a first survey of a topic, but are important for a deeper understanding.
€ Rom Harré, Great Scientific Experiments: Phaidon Press, 1981, contains a wealth of interesting case studies, and makes a wonderful supplement to this reading list (or at least it would if it were still in print.)

The 'Received View' I: Logical Empiricism
Week 1:
€ Schlick, Positivism &;Realism §II (BGT1).
€ Boyd, Confirmation, Semantics &;Scientific Theories (BGTp3-10).

Further Suggestions:
€ John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy [1843-1963!]: Penguin Books, 1968. Ch16, "Logical Positivism". A classic history of philosophical thought.
€ McGuire, "Scientific Change: Perspectives and Proposals" §4.1-4.3, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p132 142. A short historical survey of the received view.
(€ A J Ayer (ed), Logical Positivism: Free Press, 1959. A thorough collection of key essays of logical positivism. )
€ Fred Suppe, "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories" §I-III, p3-61, in Suppe (ed), The Structure of Scientific Theories: University of Illinois Press, 1974. A canonical account of the 'received' logical-empiricist view of philosophy of science from one of its leading critics.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ What is the verification principle? Give examples of (a) a meaningful sentence, (b) an analytic sentence, (c) a sentence which appears to be meaningful, but which fails the principle of verifiability.
€ According to Schlick, what might the meaning of a sentence such as "The top quark has been discovered at Fermilab" be?
€ Can you see any problems with the verification principle? (Is it meaningful? Are any of the terms it involves ambiguous? Does it make sense to think of the verification conditions of an isolated sentence?)
€ What kind of philosophy of science might you expect a logical positivist to develop? What models of confirmation and explanation might he adopt?

Week 2
€ Hempel, Laws &;Their Role in Scientific Explanation (BGTp299-307).
€ Michael Scriven, "Explanation &;Prediction in Evolutionary Theory" in Science, Vol 130.3374: 1959. p477-482.

Further Suggestions:
€ Wesley Salmon, "Scientific Explanation" §1.1-1.10, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. Ch1, p7-29. An introduction to the key theories and ideas of this week's work.
€ Hempel and Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" Part I, in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays: Free Press, 1965. p245-258. The classic modern starting point.
(€ Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions and Laws", in Feigl and Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol 3: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. p170-230. A full-out assault on the D-N model.)
€ David Lewis, "Causation" in Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973. 556-67. An alternative to a regularity account, and some insight into counterfactuals.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ Before you read, think of or find some concrete examples of explanations: scientific and otherwise. What makes them explanations? What is special about the scientific explanations? After you've read the essays, do your examples fit the DN model (or its statistical generalisation)?
€ Why is every DN explanation a prediction 'after the event'? Why might this be a problem for the theory?
€ What's the difference between a law of nature and a coincidence? Why is this important for a theory of explanation?
€ What other kinds of counter-examples to the DN model does Scriven's paper suggest?

Week 3
€ Michael Friedman, "Explanation &;Scientific Understanding", in Journal of Philosophy, Vol 73. p5-19.
€ Bas van Fraassen, Pragmatics of Explanation (BGT17).

Further Suggestions:
€ Wesley Salmon, "Scientific Explanation" §15.1-1.17, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. Ch1, p33-39. An introduction to the key theories and ideas of this week's work.
€ Wesley Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation: University of Minnesota Press, 1990. A complete survey of work on explanation: dip in as needed.
€ Peter Lipton, "Is the Best Good Enough?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: 1993. p89-104. The connection between explanation and empiricism. (Reprinted in Papineau (ed), The Philosophy of Science: Oxford University Press, 1996. p194-214.)

Questions to guide your reading:
€ Why is unification important to explanation, and did it really get left out of the DN model?
€ If we just opt for a 'pragmatic' account of explanation, what are we leaving out?
€ Having studied the debate: can there be a single account of explanation? Moreover, what do we hope to achieve by constructing a good model of explanation?

Theory Competition
Week 4
€ Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" §1-6 in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays: Free Press, 1965. p3-25.

Further Suggestions:
€ Earman &;Salmon, "Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses" §2.1-2.4, 2.9-11 in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p42-55, 89-100. An introduction to Hempel's theory and its background, and a basic account of Bootstrapping and Bayesian alternatives.
€ Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach: Open Court, 1989. A more thorough, but easy going introduction to Bayesianism.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ What is the HD model, and what is wrong with it? How does Nicod's criterion constitute an improvement?
€ What are the positivistic influences in Hempel's model?
€ Be clear about the natural criterion for confirmation, and how they lead to the raven's paradox. Do you agree with Hempel's 'resolution' of the paradox?
€ What is the 'bootstrapping' modification of the Hempel model?
€ What is the basic idea of Bayesianism, and in what ways does it agree/disagree with Hempel's view?

Week 5
€ Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding §IV.2.
€ Karl Popper, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" in Popper, Conjectures &;Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge: Basic Books, 1962. p33-59.

Further Suggestions:
€ Bertrand Russell, "On Induction" in Russell, The Problems of Philosophy: available in a number of editions. Ch VI. Another classic statement of the problem of induction.
€ Earman &;Salmon, "Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses" §2.5-2.6 in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p55-66. A survey of the problem and the many attempts to solve it.
€ Schilpp (ed), The Philosophy of Karl Popper: Open Court, 1974. Especially articles by Neale and Maxwell. A collection of papers dealing with the various aspects of Popper's work.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ It's really not a very interesting observation to simply point out that we can't be 110% sure of what will happen in the future - that's obvious. Skeptics typically wish to draw some more interesting conclusion (eg, Descartes arguably was interested in establishing the nature of knowledge by doubting): so what does Hume want to establish? What is the 'old' riddle of induction, as Goodman will term it next week.
(€ Reading on: what do you think of Hume's skeptical solution? See Goodman for his reading.)
€ Is Popper's response to Hume correct? Does he really make no inductive leaps? And if not, can he put us in a position to know anything about the future? And if not, how is it an improvement on Hume?
€ What does Popper share with his positivistic colleagues in the Vienna circle?

Week 6
€ Goodman, Fact, Fiction &;Forecast: various editions by Harvard University Press and now Dover. Ch III.
€ Duhem, Aim &;Structure of Physical Theory: Princeton University Press, 1954. Part 2, ChVI.1-4. p180-195.

Further Suggestions:
€ Stalker (ed), Grue: The New Riddle of Induction: Open Court, 1994. Especially articles by Scheffler, Harman and Hacking. A collection of key responses, and a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the literature.
€ Hempel, Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes (BGT3)
(€ Duhem, Aim &;Structure of Physical Theory: Princeton University Press, 1954. Part 2, ChVI.8-10. p208-218.
€ Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Harvard University Press, 1953. A tough but vitally significant article in contemporary philosophy -to be compared closely with Duhem's work.)

Questions to guide your reading:
€ Get really clear on the definition of grue. Make sure you know what things fall in and out of the category of grue things. Most importantly, does anything even have to change (normal) colour to be grue? Also, recall Hempel's concern with 'purely qualitative' predicates.
€ Explain the 'dissolution' of the old riddle of induction - what is the idea of the 'virtuous circle'? How does Hempel's model of confirmation figure in the account? (Does Goodman's response really resemble Hume's?)
€ Why does Duhem lead us to holism about the empirical content of scientific theories? Can there be analytic statements in science? What impact does all this have on a verificationist theory of meaning?
Week 7
€ Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Especially Introduction, Ch 4, 7 and 9 (and Postscript).

Further Suggestions:
€ Ian Hacking, "Introduction", "Incommensurability" and "Reference" in Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch5-6. A clear discussion of the basic ideas in Kuhn, in particular in comparison to the logical empiricists, and some of the responses to his alleged anti-realism.
€ Hilary Putnam, The 'Corroboration' of Theories and Explanation and Reference (BGT 6 and 9). Important critiques of Kuhn (and Popper).
€ Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation: Oxford University Press, 1984. Essay 13. A subtle undermining of the very coherence of Kuhns view.
€ Newton-Smith, "T.S.Kuhn: From Revolutionary to Social Democrat" The Rationality of Science: Routledge, 1981. Ch5. A critique of the irrationality of scientific revolutions.
(€ N R Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: Cambridge University Press, 1958. Especially Ch1-2. An account of how the world might look different after a 'paradigm shift'.)
(€ Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Harvard University Press, 1957. A detailed account of a scientific revolution: does it vindicate the claims of SSR?)

Questions to guide your reading:
€ To understand and evaluate Kuhn clearly it is vital to be clear about the notion of a paradigm. In my view the best way to do this is to put to one side the exciting ideas associated with revolutions and to concentrate on the paradigm bound activities that make up normal science. In particular, according to Kuhn what things will have to be taught to budding young scientists? How? Does the idea of a paradigm shed light on the way you have been taught science?
€ Sketch out the general pattern of the history of science that Kuhn feels he has identified. Is it historically accurate? Is it philosophically sound? (Is history relevant to philosophy?)
€ Explain the argument for meaning incommensurability: what understanding of 'meaning' does it presuppose?
€ Aside from meaning, what other incommensurabilities are there? Is it a useful notion? Does Kuhn have room for scientific progress? Should it?
€ In what ways are Popper and Kuhn similar and dissimilar?
Week 8
€ Lakatos, "History of Science &;Its Rational Reconstructions" in Hacking (ed), Scientific Revolutions: Oxford University Press, 1981. p107-127.
€ Feyerabend, "How to Defend Society Against Science" in Hacking (ed), Scientific Revolutions: Oxford University Press, 1981. p156-167.

Further Suggestions:
€ McGuire, "Scientific Change: Perspectives and Proposals" §4.1-4.10, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p132 160. A survey of the issues.
€ Hacking, "A Surrogate for Truth" in Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch8. An interpretation of Lakatos' work.
(€ Feyerabend, Against Method: New Left Books, 1977. Feyerabend's classic work.)
€ Larry Laudan, "Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism" in American Philosophical Quarterly, 1987. p19-31. (Reprinted in Papineau (ed), The Philosophy of Science: Oxford University Press, 1996. p194-214.) A contemporary look at the issues.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ How does Lakatos compare with Kuhn? Which of Kuhn's claims are countered successfully? What ideas do they share? List the points on which they differ. What are their views on progress?
€ How does Lakatos' model fit with scientific history?
€ Does society need protection from science? Isn't there an argument that nothing is more important than the truth? If scientists were right, wouldn't that be relevant to Feyerabend's claims?
The 'Received View' II: The New Received View
Week 9
€ Ronald Giere, Explaining Science: University of Chicago Press, 1988. Ch3.

Further Suggestions:
€ Fred Suppe, "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories", §IV.A-B, §V. C, in Suppe (ed), The Structure of Scientific Theories: University of Illinois Press, 1974. p62-86, 221-30. A review of the problems with the received view, and an account of the important 'semantic turn' to the new received view.
€ Patrick Suppes, "What is a Scientific Theory?", in S.Morgenbesser (ed) Philosophy of Science Today: Basic Books, 1967. p55-67. An influential article in the shift to the semantic conception of scientific theories.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ What, logically speaking is the distinction between syntax and semantics? And hence what is the difference in emphasis between syntactic and semantic conceptions of science?
€ How might the semantic conception free one from various positivistic assumptions? eg, the verification principle of meaning? The theory/observation dichotomy? The unity of science? &c.
;€ What new possibilities are opened up? What new 'open problems' does the semantic conception pose?

Realism and its Opponents
Week 10
€ Ian Hacking, "What is Scientific Realism?", Representing and Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch1.
€ James (Robert) Brown, "Explaining the Success of Science", Smoke &;Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality: Routledge, 1994. Ch1.
€ Bas van Fraassen, To Save the Phenomena (BGT10).

Further Suggestions:
€ Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism (BGT12). All past theories have turned out false, why shouldn't the current ones?
€ Carol and Charles Chihara, "A Biological Objection to Constructive Empiricism", in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1993. p653-8. Possible problems for van Fraassen.
€ Paul Churchland, "The Anti-Realist Epistemology of Van Fraassen's 'The Scientific Image'", in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1982, p226-35. Another discussion of van Fraassen.
€ Hacking, "Positivism" in Representing and Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch3. Hacking draws the parallels between van Fraassen and logical empiricists.
(€ Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker, Images of Science: University of Chicago Press, 1985. The big book of debates about constructive empiricism.)

Questions to guide your reading:
€ What are realism and anti-realism? What different kinds are there? What are standard realist arguments? Anti-realist arguments?
€ What is 'verisimilitude'? What role is it supposed to play in these arguments, and what are the problems with this concept?
€ Does van Fraassen give an adequate idea of the distinction between the observable and unobservable parts of a theory?
€ Is constructive empiricism really anti-realist ? Why is it 'constructive'?

Week 11
€ Arthur Fine, The Natural Ontological Attitude (BGT14).

Further Suggestions:
€ Clark Glymour, "Realism and the Nature of Theories", Ch3, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p104-131. An introduction to the topic of realism and anti-realism.
€ Arthur Fine, "And not Anti-Realism Either", in The Shaky Game: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Ch8. In the main selection the arguments concentrate on distinguishing the NOA from realism: but it is also to be distinguished from anti realism as traditionally understood.
€ Ernan McMullin, "Selective Anti-Realism", in Philosophical Studies, 1991. p97-108. An article disputing the claim that there is stable ground for the NOA.
€ Joseph Rouse, "The Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of Science", in Philosophy of Science, 1991. p607-627. An interpretation of the NOA that draws out similarities to other recent developments in social and humanistic studies.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ What is the NOA? How is it to be distinguished from realism and anti-realism? What image of science does it give?
€ Is Fine correct in seeing a stable position between/transcending the two traditional views?
€ How does the NOA connect to 'postmodern' thought?
Week 12
€ Ian Hacking, Experimentation and Scientific Reasoning (BGT13).
€ Nancy Cartwright, Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws (BGT20).

Further Suggestions:
€ Hacking, "Building and Causing" and "Intervening" in Representing and Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch2 and Part II. Comments on Cartwright, and the full development of Hacking's views.
€ Hacking, "Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing", in Philosophy of Science, 1989. p555-71. A case study of Hacking's entity realism.
€ Alan Gross, "Reinventing Certainty: The Significance of Ian Hacking's Realism", in PSA 1990: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association Conference: Philosophy of Science Association, 1990. p421-431. An analysis of Hacking's views.
€ Nancy Cartwright, Introduction and Essay 7 of How the Laws of Physics Lie: Oxford University Press, 1983. Additional material outlining Cartwright's position.
€ Cartwright, "Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93.2, 1994. p279-92. (Reprinted in Papineau (ed), The Philosophy of Science: Oxford University Press, 1996. p314-326.) Indicative of the direction Cartwright's work has developed.
€ Laymon, "Cartwright and the Lying Laws of Physics", in Journal of Philosophy, 1989. p353-72.Further development and discussion of Cartwright.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ Is Hacking's experimental realism applicable to all branches of science?
€ Does Hacking suppose that we can literally determine the beliefs of scientists about the unobservable by observing their practice? Should we, as philosophers, take seriously the beliefs 'read off' laboratory practice? Don't scientists conduct experiments, not necessarily on the basis of what they actually believe, but on a 'pretense' that it is 'as if' the unobserved was of a certain kind? And if they're only pretending, why is it helpful to realism?
€ What would it mean for the laws to 'tell the truth'? Could there really be no true laws of physics?
€ What is a 'phenomenological law' on Cartwright's view? A fundamental law?
€ What further examples illustrate Cartwright's idea? Eg, look at some example from physics - do the laws lie or tell the truth?
€ What kind of realism does Cartwright hold? How does it compare to Hacking's or Brown's? (Or van Fraassen's?)

Week 13
€ Bruno Latour &;Steve Woolgar,"From Order to Disorder", Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts: Princeton University Press, 1979/1988. Ch1.
€ Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology", Inquiry 32, 1989.

Further Suggestions:
€ McGuire, "Scientific Change: Perspectives and Proposals", §4.14-17, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p167 77. An introductory discussion of various 'sociological' approaches.
€ James Brown, "Latour's Prosaic Science", in Smoke &;Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality: Routledge, 1994. Ch3. A robust critique of Latour.
€ Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientfic Inquiry: Princeton University Press, 1989. An important recent study in the sociology of science, with different ends to Latour.
€ Shirley Strum, Almost Human: A journey into the World of Baboons: Norton, 1987. An illustration (?) of the 'gendering of epistemology'.
(€ David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery: University of Chicago Press, 1976/1991. The classical statement of the 'strong programme' of the sociology of epistemology -- there is no knowledge but social knowledge.
€ Newton-Smith, "Strong Programmes" The Rationality of Science: Routledge, 1981. ChX. A critique of Bloor.)

Questions to guide your reading:
€ Surely it is a truism that culture will determine what our science looks like, but is this fact significant? Does it mean that scientific knowledge reduces to social convention?
€ How does Latour differ from other constructivists - like Bloor? What are the significant points of contrast between Latour and a realist view of science?
€ What are the key ideas of a feminist philosophy of science? Are they the kind of insights that can be joined to the traditional positions that we have studied so far?
€ What case studies illustrate the points that Jagger or Longino propose?

Unity of Science
Week 14
€ Putnam &;Oppenheim, Unity of Science (BGT22).
€ Fodor, Special Sciences (BGT23).

Further Suggestions:
€ J.D.Trout, Reductionism and the Unity of Science (BGT387-92). A survey article.
(€ Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science (BGT 21). Since the positivists saw all genuine knowledge as essential 'scientific', the unity of all legitimate science was an important doctrine for them.)
€ Alan Garfinkel, Reductionism (BGT 24). Problems for a Putnam-Oppenheim view of reduction.
€ Harold Kincaid, "Molecular Biology and the Unity of Science", Philosophy of Science, 1990. p575-93. A very nice case study clearly illustrating the difficulties involved in theses of reduction.

Questions to guide your reading:
€ Are Putnam and Oppenheim's examples convincing? (Consider one or two in detail.)
€ What philosophical positions would drive one to accept unity as conceived by Putnam and Oppenheim?
€ What problems for the thesis do Fodor, Garfinkel and Kinkaid see? Is the result of their arguments that parts of nature simply are not physical? Or what weaker notions of reduction are consistent with their critiques?

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