Introduction:
€ This
bibliography is intended for advanced undergraduates or for a graduate
survey course. For the former the list is pretty maximal, and so that
students are not overloaded I suggest they use it for ideas for further
reading, skimming as much as possible, but only reading a few articles of
interest on each topic. For graduate students I think a comprehensive
survey should have them read most of the things on the list, though some
more thoroughly than others.
€ Many of the readings are to be found in Boyd, Gasper and Trout's collection, The Philosophy of Science, as I wanted to maximize the number of pieces that the students could have collected in one place. As you'll see, I also draw heavily on Papineau's recent collection, The Philosophy of Science, on Salmon &al's;Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, and Hacking's Representing and Intervening. These last two I have found extremely useful for their introductory survey essays. (Full citations below)
€ The bibliography is designed so that most of the major figures and ideas in twentieth century philosophy of science are covered (as far as possible through original texts, but sometimes through secondary sources). Some will no doubt think that it is better pedagogy to cover fewer topics in more detail, to spend less time studying the views of others, and more time letting students practice philosophy. Despite the range of topics covered I have found that in a standard semester it is possible to cover the bulk of the material here, and give the students time to develop their own more specific projects: typically students develop substantial final papers in a series of drafts in the second half of the term.
€ The other problem with attempting a broad survey is that some issues don't get the time they perhaps deserve: in particular, I feel that I could do a better job of integrating sociological and feminist approaches into the bibliography.
€ Finally, I apologize that the references aren't in full Chicago Manual of Style form: the reading list was written for students finding books on library reserve, so I kept the citations brief.
€ I hope that you find this syllabus useful: please let me have any comments that you might have (especially through the HOPOS-L list.) Any additions, subtractions or corrections are welcome.
Philosophy of Science Annotated
Bibliography
Nick Huggett, University of Illinois at Chicago -
3/25/97
€ 'BGT' indicates that a reference is to be found in Boyd,
Gasper and Trout (eds) The Philosophy of Science: MIT Press,
1993.
€ Parentheses around suggestions indicate that these are
less recommended on a first survey of a topic, but are important for a
deeper understanding.
€ Rom Harré, Great Scientific
Experiments: Phaidon Press, 1981, contains a wealth of interesting case
studies, and makes a wonderful supplement to this reading list (or at least
it would if it were still in print.)
The 'Received View' I: Logical
Empiricism
Week 1:
€ Schlick, Positivism &;Realism
§II (BGT1).
€ Boyd, Confirmation, Semantics &;Scientific
Theories (BGTp3-10).
Further Suggestions:
€ John Passmore,
A Hundred Years of Philosophy [1843-1963!]: Penguin Books, 1968.
Ch16, "Logical Positivism". A classic history of philosophical
thought.
€ McGuire, "Scientific Change: Perspectives and
Proposals" §4.1-4.3, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p132 142. A short
historical survey of the received view.
(€ A J Ayer (ed),
Logical Positivism: Free Press, 1959. A thorough collection of
key essays of logical positivism. )
€ Fred Suppe, "The Search
for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories" §I-III, p3-61,
in Suppe (ed), The Structure of Scientific Theories: University of
Illinois Press, 1974. A canonical account of the 'received'
logical-empiricist view of philosophy of science from one of its leading
critics.
Questions to guide your reading:
€ What is the
verification principle? Give examples of (a) a meaningful sentence, (b) an
analytic sentence, (c) a sentence which appears to be meaningful, but which
fails the principle of verifiability.
€ According to Schlick, what
might the meaning of a sentence such as "The top quark has been discovered
at Fermilab" be?
€ Can you see any problems with the verification
principle? (Is it meaningful? Are any of the terms it involves ambiguous?
Does it make sense to think of the verification conditions of an isolated
sentence?)
€ What kind of philosophy of science might you expect a
logical positivist to develop? What models of confirmation and explanation
might he adopt?
Explanation
Week 2
€ Hempel,
Laws &;Their Role in Scientific Explanation
(BGTp299-307).
€ Michael Scriven, "Explanation &;Prediction in
Evolutionary Theory" in Science, Vol 130.3374: 1959.
p477-482.
Further Suggestions:
€ Wesley Salmon, "Scientific
Explanation" §1.1-1.10, in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to
the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. Ch1, p7-29. An
introduction to the key theories and ideas of this week's
work.
€ Hempel and Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of
Explanation" Part I, in Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and
Other Essays: Free Press, 1965. p245-258. The classic modern
starting point.
(€ Scriven, "Explanations, Predictions and
Laws", in Feigl and Maxwell (eds), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, Vol 3: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. p170-230. A
full-out assault on the D-N model.)
€ David Lewis, "Causation"
in Journal of Philosophy 70, 1973. 556-67. An alternative to a
regularity account, and some insight into counterfactuals.
Questions
to guide your reading:
€ Before you read, think of or find some
concrete examples of explanations: scientific and otherwise. What makes
them explanations? What is special about the scientific explanations? After
you've read the essays, do your examples fit the DN model (or its
statistical generalisation)?
€ Why is every DN explanation a
prediction 'after the event'? Why might this be a problem for the
theory?
€ What's the difference between a law of nature and a
coincidence? Why is this important for a theory of explanation?
€
What other kinds of counter-examples to the DN model does Scriven's paper
suggest?
Week 3
€ Michael Friedman, "Explanation
&;Scientific Understanding", in Journal of Philosophy, Vol
73. p5-19.
€ Bas van Fraassen, Pragmatics of
Explanation (BGT17).
Further Suggestions:
€ Wesley Salmon,
"Scientific Explanation" §15.1-1.17, in Merrilee Salmon et al,
Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. Ch1,
p33-39. An introduction to the key theories and ideas of this week's
work.
€ Wesley Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific
Explanation: University of Minnesota Press, 1990. A complete survey
of work on explanation: dip in as needed.
€ Peter Lipton, "Is
the Best Good Enough?" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society:
1993. p89-104. The connection between explanation and empiricism.
(Reprinted in Papineau (ed), The Philosophy of Science: Oxford
University Press, 1996. p194-214.)
Questions to guide your
reading:
€ Why is unification important to explanation, and did it
really get left out of the DN model?
€ If we just opt for a
'pragmatic' account of explanation, what are we leaving out?
€
Having studied the debate: can there be a single account of explanation?
Moreover, what do we hope to achieve by constructing a good model of
explanation?
Theory Competition
Week 4
€
Hempel, "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" §1-6 in Hempel,
Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays: Free Press,
1965. p3-25.
Further Suggestions:
€ Earman &;Salmon,
"Confirmation of Scientific Hypotheses" §2.1-2.4, 2.9-11 in Merrilee
Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science:
Prentice-Hall, 1992. p42-55, 89-100. An introduction to Hempel's theory
and its background, and a basic account of Bootstrapping and Bayesian
alternatives.
€ Colin Howson and Peter Urbach, Scientific
Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach: Open Court, 1989. A more thorough,
but easy going introduction to Bayesianism.
Questions to guide your
reading:
€ What is the HD model, and what is wrong with it? How
does Nicod's criterion constitute an improvement?
€ What are the
positivistic influences in Hempel's model?
€ Be clear about the
natural criterion for confirmation, and how they lead to the raven's
paradox. Do you agree with Hempel's 'resolution' of the paradox?
€
What is the 'bootstrapping' modification of the Hempel model?
€
What is the basic idea of Bayesianism, and in what ways does it
agree/disagree with Hempel's view?
Week 5
€ Hume, An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding §IV.2.
€ Karl
Popper, "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" in Popper, Conjectures
&;Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge: Basic Books, 1962.
p33-59.
Further Suggestions:
€ Bertrand Russell,
"On Induction" in Russell, The Problems of Philosophy: available in
a number of editions. Ch VI. Another classic statement of the problem of
induction.
€ Earman &;Salmon, "Confirmation of Scientific
Hypotheses" §2.5-2.6 in Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science: Prentice-Hall, 1992. p55-66. A survey of the
problem and the many attempts to solve it.
€ Schilpp (ed),
The Philosophy of Karl Popper: Open Court, 1974. Especially articles
by Neale and Maxwell. A collection of papers dealing with the various
aspects of Popper's work.
Questions to guide your
reading:
€ It's really not a very interesting observation to
simply point out that we can't be 110% sure of what will happen in the
future - that's obvious. Skeptics typically wish to draw some more
interesting conclusion (eg, Descartes arguably was interested in
establishing the nature of knowledge by doubting): so what does Hume want
to establish? What is the 'old' riddle of induction, as Goodman will term
it next week.
(€ Reading on: what do you think of Hume's skeptical
solution? See Goodman for his reading.)
€ Is Popper's response to
Hume correct? Does he really make no inductive leaps? And if not, can he
put us in a position to know anything about the future? And if not, how is
it an improvement on Hume?
€ What does Popper share with his
positivistic colleagues in the Vienna circle?
Week
6
€ Goodman, Fact, Fiction &;Forecast: various editions by
Harvard University Press and now Dover. Ch III.
€ Duhem, Aim
&;Structure of Physical Theory: Princeton University Press, 1954. Part
2, ChVI.1-4. p180-195.
Further Suggestions:
€
Stalker (ed), Grue: The New Riddle of Induction: Open Court, 1994.
Especially articles by Scheffler, Harman and Hacking. A collection of
key responses, and a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the
literature.
€ Hempel, Empiricist Criteria of
Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes (BGT3)
(€ Duhem,
Aim &;Structure of Physical Theory: Princeton University Press,
1954. Part 2, ChVI.8-10. p208-218.
€ Quine, "Two Dogmas of
Empiricism" in Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Harvard
University Press, 1953. A tough but vitally significant article in
contemporary philosophy -to be compared closely with Duhem's
work.)
Questions to guide your reading:
€ Get really clear
on the definition of grue. Make sure you know what things fall in and out
of the category of grue things. Most importantly, does anything even have
to change (normal) colour to be grue? Also, recall Hempel's concern with
'purely qualitative' predicates.
€ Explain the 'dissolution' of
the old riddle of induction - what is the idea of the 'virtuous circle'?
How does Hempel's model of confirmation figure in the account? (Does
Goodman's response really resemble Hume's?)
€ Why does Duhem lead
us to holism about the empirical content of scientific theories? Can there
be analytic statements in science? What impact does all this have on a
verificationist theory of meaning?
Week 7
€ Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: University of Chicago
Press, 1962. Especially Introduction, Ch 4, 7 and 9 (and
Postscript).
Further Suggestions:
€ Ian Hacking,
"Introduction", "Incommensurability" and "Reference" in Hacking,
Representing and Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Ch5-6. A clear discussion of the basic ideas in Kuhn, in particular in
comparison to the logical empiricists, and some of the responses to his
alleged anti-realism.
€ Hilary Putnam, The 'Corroboration'
of Theories and Explanation and Reference (BGT 6 and 9).
Important critiques of Kuhn (and Popper).
€ Donald
Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" in Davidson,
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation: Oxford University Press,
1984. Essay 13. A subtle undermining of the very coherence of Kuhns
view.
€ Newton-Smith, "T.S.Kuhn: From Revolutionary to Social
Democrat" The Rationality of Science: Routledge, 1981. Ch5. A
critique of the irrationality of scientific revolutions.
(€ N
R Hanson, Patterns of Discovery: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
Especially Ch1-2. An account of how the world might look different after
a 'paradigm shift'.)
(€ Kuhn, The Copernican
Revolution: Harvard University Press, 1957. A detailed account of a
scientific revolution: does it vindicate the claims of
SSR?)
Questions to guide your reading:
€ To understand and
evaluate Kuhn clearly it is vital to be clear about the notion of a
paradigm. In my view the best way to do this is to put to one side the
exciting ideas associated with revolutions and to concentrate on the
paradigm bound activities that make up normal science. In particular,
according to Kuhn what things will have to be taught to budding young
scientists? How? Does the idea of a paradigm shed light on the way you have
been taught science?
€ Sketch out the general pattern of the
history of science that Kuhn feels he has identified. Is it historically
accurate? Is it philosophically sound? (Is history relevant to
philosophy?)
€ Explain the argument for meaning
incommensurability: what understanding of 'meaning' does it
presuppose?
€ Aside from meaning, what other incommensurabilities
are there? Is it a useful notion? Does Kuhn have room for scientific
progress? Should it?
€ In what ways are Popper and Kuhn similar
and dissimilar?
Week 8
€ Lakatos, "History of Science
&;Its Rational Reconstructions" in Hacking (ed), Scientific
Revolutions: Oxford University Press, 1981. p107-127.
€
Feyerabend, "How to Defend Society Against Science" in Hacking (ed),
Scientific Revolutions: Oxford University Press, 1981.
p156-167.
Further Suggestions:
€ McGuire,
"Scientific Change: Perspectives and Proposals" §4.1-4.10, in Merrilee
Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science:
Prentice-Hall, 1992. p132 160. A survey of the issues.
€
Hacking, "A Surrogate for Truth" in Hacking, Representing and
Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch8. An
interpretation of Lakatos' work.
(€ Feyerabend, Against
Method: New Left Books, 1977. Feyerabend's classic
work.)
€ Larry Laudan, "Progress or Rationality? The Prospects
for Normative Naturalism" in American Philosophical Quarterly, 1987.
p19-31. (Reprinted in Papineau (ed), The Philosophy of Science:
Oxford University Press, 1996. p194-214.) A contemporary look at the
issues.
Questions to guide your reading:
€ How does Lakatos
compare with Kuhn? Which of Kuhn's claims are countered successfully? What
ideas do they share? List the points on which they differ. What are their
views on progress?
€ How does Lakatos' model fit with scientific
history?
€ Does society need protection from science? Isn't there
an argument that nothing is more important than the truth? If scientists
were right, wouldn't that be relevant to Feyerabend's claims?
The 'Received View' II: The New Received View
Week
9
€ Ronald Giere, Explaining Science: University of Chicago
Press, 1988. Ch3.
Further Suggestions:
€ Fred Suppe, "The
Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories", §IV.A-B,
§V. C, in Suppe (ed), The Structure of Scientific Theories:
University of Illinois Press, 1974. p62-86, 221-30. A review of the
problems with the received view, and an account of the important 'semantic
turn' to the new received view.
€ Patrick Suppes, "What is a
Scientific Theory?", in S.Morgenbesser (ed) Philosophy of Science
Today: Basic Books, 1967. p55-67. An influential article in the
shift to the semantic conception of scientific theories.
Questions
to guide your reading:
€ What, logically speaking is the
distinction between syntax and semantics? And hence what is the difference
in emphasis between syntactic and semantic conceptions of
science?
€ How might the semantic conception free one from various
positivistic assumptions? eg, the verification principle of meaning? The
theory/observation dichotomy? The unity of science? &c.
;€ What new
possibilities are opened up? What new 'open problems' does the semantic
conception pose?
Realism and its Opponents
Week 10
€ Ian Hacking, "What is Scientific Realism?", Representing and
Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch1.
€ James
(Robert) Brown, "Explaining the Success of Science", Smoke &;Mirrors:
How Science Reflects Reality: Routledge, 1994. Ch1.
€ Bas van
Fraassen, To Save the Phenomena (BGT10).
Further Suggestions:
€ Larry Laudan, A Confutation of Convergent Realism
(BGT12). All past theories have turned out false, why shouldn't the
current ones?
€ Carol and Charles Chihara, "A Biological
Objection to Constructive Empiricism", in British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 1993. p653-8. Possible problems for van
Fraassen.
€ Paul Churchland, "The Anti-Realist Epistemology of
Van Fraassen's 'The Scientific Image'", in Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly, 1982, p226-35. Another discussion of van
Fraassen.
€ Hacking, "Positivism" in Representing and
Intervening: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch3. Hacking draws
the parallels between van Fraassen and logical empiricists.
(€
Paul Churchland and Clifford Hooker, Images of Science: University
of Chicago Press, 1985. The big book of debates about constructive
empiricism.)
Questions to guide your reading:
€ What are
realism and anti-realism? What different kinds are there? What are standard
realist arguments? Anti-realist arguments?
€ What is
'verisimilitude'? What role is it supposed to play in these arguments, and
what are the problems with this concept?
€ Does van Fraassen give
an adequate idea of the distinction between the observable and unobservable
parts of a theory?
€ Is constructive empiricism really anti-realist
? Why is it 'constructive'?
Week 11
€ Arthur Fine, The
Natural Ontological Attitude (BGT14).
Further Suggestions:
€ Clark Glymour, "Realism and the Nature of Theories", Ch3, in
Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science:
Prentice-Hall, 1992. p104-131. An introduction to the topic of realism
and anti-realism.
€ Arthur Fine, "And not Anti-Realism
Either", in The Shaky Game: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Ch8.
In the main selection the arguments concentrate on distinguishing the
NOA from realism: but it is also to be distinguished from anti realism as
traditionally understood.
€ Ernan McMullin, "Selective
Anti-Realism", in Philosophical Studies, 1991. p97-108. An
article disputing the claim that there is stable ground for the
NOA.
€ Joseph Rouse, "The Politics of Postmodern Philosophy of
Science", in Philosophy of Science, 1991. p607-627. An
interpretation of the NOA that draws out similarities to other recent
developments in social and humanistic studies.
Questions to
guide your reading:
€ What is the NOA? How is it to be
distinguished from realism and anti-realism? What image of science does it
give?
€ Is Fine correct in seeing a stable position
between/transcending the two traditional views?
€ How does the NOA
connect to 'postmodern' thought?
Week 12
€ Ian Hacking,
Experimentation and Scientific Reasoning (BGT13).
€ Nancy
Cartwright, Reality of Causes in a World of Instrumental Laws
(BGT20).
Further Suggestions:
€ Hacking, "Building and
Causing" and "Intervening" in Representing and Intervening:
Cambridge University Press, 1983. Ch2 and Part II. Comments on
Cartwright, and the full development of Hacking's views.
€
Hacking, "Extragalactic Reality: The Case of Gravitational Lensing", in
Philosophy of Science, 1989. p555-71. A case study of Hacking's
entity realism.
€ Alan Gross, "Reinventing Certainty: The
Significance of Ian Hacking's Realism", in PSA 1990: Proceedings of the
Philosophy of Science Association Conference: Philosophy of Science
Association, 1990. p421-431. An analysis of Hacking's
views.
€ Nancy Cartwright, Introduction and Essay 7 of How
the Laws of Physics Lie: Oxford University Press, 1983. Additional
material outlining Cartwright's position.
€ Cartwright,
"Fundamentalism vs the Patchwork of Laws" in Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 93.2, 1994. p279-92. (Reprinted in Papineau (ed),
The Philosophy of Science: Oxford University Press, 1996. p314-326.)
Indicative of the direction Cartwright's work has
developed.
€ Laymon, "Cartwright and the Lying Laws of
Physics", in Journal of Philosophy, 1989. p353-72.Further
development and discussion of Cartwright.
Questions to guide your
reading:
€ Is Hacking's experimental realism applicable to
all branches of science?
€ Does Hacking suppose that we can
literally determine the beliefs of scientists about the unobservable by
observing their practice? Should we, as philosophers, take seriously the
beliefs 'read off' laboratory practice? Don't scientists conduct
experiments, not necessarily on the basis of what they actually believe,
but on a 'pretense' that it is 'as if' the unobserved was of a certain
kind? And if they're only pretending, why is it helpful to
realism?
€ What would it mean for the laws to 'tell the truth'?
Could there really be no true laws of physics?
€ What is a
'phenomenological law' on Cartwright's view? A fundamental law?
€
What further examples illustrate Cartwright's idea? Eg, look at some
example from physics - do the laws lie or tell the truth?
€ What
kind of realism does Cartwright hold? How does it compare to Hacking's or
Brown's? (Or van Fraassen's?)
Week 13
€ Bruno Latour &;Steve
Woolgar,"From Order to Disorder", Laboratory Life: The Construction of
Scientific Facts: Princeton University Press, 1979/1988.
Ch1.
€ Alison Jaggar, "Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist
Epistemology", Inquiry 32, 1989.
Further Suggestions:
€
McGuire, "Scientific Change: Perspectives and Proposals", §4.14-17, in
Merrilee Salmon et al, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science:
Prentice-Hall, 1992. p167 77. An introductory discussion of various
'sociological' approaches.
€ James Brown, "Latour's Prosaic
Science", in Smoke &;Mirrors: How Science Reflects Reality:
Routledge, 1994. Ch3. A robust critique of Latour.
€ Helen
Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in
Scientfic Inquiry: Princeton University Press, 1989. An important
recent study in the sociology of science, with different ends to
Latour.
€ Shirley Strum, Almost Human: A journey into the
World of Baboons: Norton, 1987. An illustration (?) of the
'gendering of epistemology'.
(€ David Bloor, Knowledge and
Social Imagery: University of Chicago Press, 1976/1991. The
classical statement of the 'strong programme' of the sociology of
epistemology -- there is no knowledge but social knowledge.
€
Newton-Smith, "Strong Programmes" The Rationality of Science:
Routledge, 1981. ChX. A critique of Bloor.)
Questions to guide
your reading:
€ Surely it is a truism that culture will determine
what our science looks like, but is this fact significant? Does it mean
that scientific knowledge reduces to social convention?
€ How does
Latour differ from other constructivists - like Bloor? What are the
significant points of contrast between Latour and a realist view of
science?
€ What are the key ideas of a feminist philosophy of
science? Are they the kind of insights that can be joined to the
traditional positions that we have studied so far?
€ What case
studies illustrate the points that Jagger or Longino
propose?
Unity of Science
Week 14
€ Putnam
&;Oppenheim, Unity of Science (BGT22).
€ Fodor, Special
Sciences (BGT23).
Further Suggestions:
€ J.D.Trout,
Reductionism and the Unity of Science (BGT387-92). A survey
article.
(€ Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of the Unity
of Science (BGT 21). Since the positivists saw all genuine knowledge
as essential 'scientific', the unity of all legitimate science was an
important doctrine for them.)
€ Alan Garfinkel,
Reductionism (BGT 24). Problems for a Putnam-Oppenheim view of
reduction.
€ Harold Kincaid, "Molecular Biology and the Unity
of Science", Philosophy of Science, 1990. p575-93. A very nice
case study clearly illustrating the difficulties involved in theses of
reduction.
Questions to guide your reading:
€ Are Putnam
and Oppenheim's examples convincing? (Consider one or two in
detail.)
€ What philosophical positions would drive one to accept
unity as conceived by Putnam and Oppenheim?
€ What problems for
the thesis do Fodor, Garfinkel and Kinkaid see? Is the result of their
arguments that parts of nature simply are not physical? Or what weaker
notions of reduction are consistent with their critiques?