## Applied Statistics Bayes' Theorem



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"Statistics is merely a quantization of common sense"

### Problem

Suppose a drug test can be characterized as follows:

- 99% positive results for users (99% sensitive, i.e. 1% Type I errors).
- 99% negative results for non-users (99% specific, i.e. 1% Type II errors).

If 0.5% of a population is using the drug, and a random person tests positive, what is the chance that he is using the drug?

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The answer is 33.2%, i.e. NOT very high! The reason is the **prior probability**. False positives (0.995%) are large compared to true positives (0.495%). (D = user,  $\overline{D}$  = non=user, + = positive test, - = negative test)



## Bayes' Theorem

Though Thomas Bayes was elected fellow of the Royal Society, his most famous paper was published posthumously.

It was an attempt to answer a problem stated by **Abraham de Moivre**, and went by the name: *"Essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances"* (1764).

Bayes correctly realized, that in some cases one needs to know the **prior probability**.

Conditional probability (A given B) depends on the inverse (B given A).

Bayes' Theorem was later proposed independently by **Pierre-Simon Laplace**, who also extended its use. Little did they know, that the theorem has founded an **interpretation of probability**.

$$P(h \mid D) = \frac{P(D \mid h)P(h)}{P(D)}$$

- P(h|D) = posterior probability of h
- P(h) = prior probability of h
- P(D|h) =probability of observing Dgiven that h holds
- P(D) =probability of observing D

J. Bayes.

# Bayes' Theorem illustrated



### Bayes' Theorem

#### Likelihood

describes how well the model predicts the data

P(data|model, I)

P(data,l)



Reverend Thomas Bayes (1702-1761) P(model|data, I) = P(model, I)

#### Posterior Probability

represents the degree to which we believe a given **model** accurately describes the situation given the available **data** and all of our prior information **I**  Prior Probability

describes the degree to which we believe the model accurately describes reality based on all of our prior information. Normalizing constant

#### Different versions...

The "original" version of Bayes' Theorem was stated as follows:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A) P(A)}{P(B)}$$

However, it can be expanded (using the total law of probability) to:

$$P(A|B) = \frac{P(B|A) P(A)}{\sum_{i} P(B|A_i) P(A_i)}.$$

It is in this form, that Bayes' Theorem is most often used.

#### Interpretations

One way Bayes' Theorem is often used in normal thinking is:

 $P(\text{theory}|\text{data}) \propto P(\text{data}|\text{theory}) \cdot P(\text{theory}).$ 

Here, P(data) has been omitted.

The trouble is, that it is hard to define a "degree of belief" in a theory.

Perhaps Glen Cowan sums it up best (chapter 1):

Bayesian statistics provides no fundamental rule for assigning the prior probability to a theory, but once this has been done, it says how one's degree of belief should change in the light of experimental data.